Overriding advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment by Willmott, Lindy et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
Willmott, Lindy and White, Benjamin P. and Howard, Michelle T. (2006) Overriding 
advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment. Medicine and Law, 25. p. 647. 
 
 
          © Copyright 2006 Medicine & Law 
 1
Overriding Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment1  
Lindy Willmott, Ben White and Michelle Howard2 
 
1. Introduction  
The right of a competent adult to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment has been endorsed 
throughout the common law world, including in the United States,3 Canada,4 New Zealand,5 
and the United Kingdom.6  The common law has also recognised that an adult may make a 
decision to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment in advance of the medical situation 
arising.7 The Australian courts have not yet directly considered whether the recognition of 
such directives forms part of the common law of this country but it is generally accepted that 
this is the case.8  Some Australian jurisdictions have put the matter beyond doubt by 
legislating to recognise the right of an adult to refuse treatment in advance. 9  The statutes 
vary significantly in scope and operation, but all allow an adult, in some circumstances, to 
complete a directive refusing life-sustaining medical treatment at a future time when that adult 
no longer has capacity to make the decision.  In most jurisdictions where advance directives 
are recognised by statute, provision is also made for the common law to continue to operate, 
giving rise to a two-tier system.10 
 
A failure to follow an advance directive, including one that refuses life-sustaining medical 
treatment, attracts legal consequences.  Providing treatment without consent11 brings with it 
the possibility of the health professional facing both criminal and civil liability.12 Criminal 
charges of assault or battery13 may be laid and the adult may also pursue a civil claim for 
trespass to the person.14  Some jurisdictions with legislation on the issue also create a separate 
criminal offence.15 
 
However, there are circumstances in which it is appropriate that an advance directive not be 
followed.  At common law, the crucial inquiry is whether the adult intended or would have 
intended the refusal given in advance to cover the situation that has arisen. If he or she did 
not, then the directive is not binding and need not be followed by the health professional.  In 
contrast, the statutory jurisdictions create formal excuses that allow health professionals not to 
follow advance directives in particular situations. 
 
This paper explores the excuses upon which health professionals can rely at common law and 
under Australian legislation16 to decline to follow valid advance directives that refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment.17  Each excuse will be considered in turn. 
 
2.  Change in circumstances 
Circumstances may change after an adult has executed an advance directive in such a way that 
the adult would not have intended the directive to apply to the changed circumstances.   The 
common law has recognised that, in such a case, a health professional should not be required 
to comply with the advance refusal of treatment.  One way in which circumstances might 
change is in relation to an adult’s personal circumstances, such as a change in his or her 
values or beliefs.18  This occurred in HE v A Hospital NHS Trust19 where a young woman 
executed an advance directive refusing blood transfusions while she was a Jehovah’s Witness. 
Because she later agreed to revert to being a Muslim, the court held that the refusal could no 
longer be regarded as representing her views and need not be followed. Another change in 
circumstances sufficient to warrant not following an advance directive could arise in relation 
to the treatment options available in a particular case.20  It is possible that advances in medical 
science may mean that an adult suffering from what was previously a progressive, terminal 
and incurable illness could now be treated and cured.  In such a case, that change in 
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circumstances may be sufficient justification for finding that the refusal of treatment is not 
intended to operate.21 
 
On the whole, a much narrower approach has been taken in the statutory jurisdictions in 
relation to the issue of a change of circumstances.  Only the Queensland legislation expressly 
excuses a health professional for not following an advance directive if there is a change in the 
circumstances of the adult.22  The provision would obviously include a change in an adult’s 
personal circumstances and it also specifically refers to a change in circumstances arising out 
of advances in medical science.  The Australian Capital Territory’s legislation does not 
address the issue of change of circumstances and provisions in the Victorian, South Australian 
and the Northern Territory legislation do so only in a limited way, providing that an advance 
directive will cease to apply or will not operate if the medical condition of the adult has 
changed.23   
 
It seems that the excuse in Queensland is broader than the common law as it refers to a health 
professional who has ‘reasonable grounds to believe … that circumstances … have changed 
to the extent that the terms of the direction are inappropriate.’  At common law, the test that is 
applied is whether the change in circumstances is such that the adult would not have intended 
his or her refusal to apply to the circumstances that have arisen.24  The wording of the 
Queensland provision, however, with its reference to a health professional’s belief (on 
reasonable grounds) that the direction is inappropriate seems to shift the focus of the enquiry 
away from the adult and toward the health professional.   
 
How such a provision might operate can be illustrated by the case of a 25 year old woman 
who makes an advance directive refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.  Subsequent to 
the completion of the directive, the woman has a child.  The Queensland provision is wide 
enough to allow a health professional not to follow the advance directive on the basis that, 
since the adult now has the responsibility for a young child, it is no longer ‘appropriate’ to 
comply with the directive.  The authors contend that the excuse as drafted in Queensland is 
too wide as it enables an unjustifiable departure from an adult’s directive.  The common law 
position is to be preferred as it strikes a more sensible balance between principles of 
autonomy and the sanctity of life. 
 
3.  Intention to revoke advance directive 
If an advance directive has been revoked, it is clear that a health professional should not rely 
upon it.  The situation is more complex if a health professional believes that the adult 
intended to revoke the advance directive, yet had not done so at the time that a decision needs 
to be made about treatment.  The legislation in South Australia, the Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory specifically deals with this kind of situation.  A health 
professional must not comply with an advance directive if he or she believes that the adult 
intended to revoke that directive (South Australia25 and the Northern Territory26), or if the 
health professional believes on reasonable grounds that the adult has changed his or her mind 
since making the direction (Australian Capital Territory27).   
 
Queensland, Victoria and those jurisdictions governed by the common law do not have an 
excuse that specifically relates to such an intention.  However, there is some overlap between 
this excuse and that relating to a change in circumstances discussed above, particularly where 
such a change relates to an adult’s personal circumstances.  There may be situations where 
evidence of an intention to revoke an advance directive will also reveal a change in 
circumstances sufficient to warrant not following the directive.  For example, an adult may 
have made an advance directive before having children but, after becoming a parent, 
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discussed with people that he or she has had a change of heart about the directions given.  In 
such a case, a health professional would be entitled not to follow the directive and rely on the 
excuse of an intention to revoke a directive or on the excuse for a change in circumstances, 
depending on the jurisdiction in which the situation arose.  This overlap of excuses is 
reflected in the fact that all Australian jurisdictions except for Victoria have either one or the 
other.  
 
Apart from the reservations already expressed in relation to the discretion given to health 
professionals by Queensland’s change of circumstances excuse, the authors believe that the 
excuse of an intention to revoke the directive (or the application of the change in 
circumstances excuse in those situations) is appropriate.  The excuse strikes a proper balance 
between the need to follow an adult’s expressed directions while still ensuring that treatment 
is not withheld or withdrawn inappropriately.  If an adult has indicated his or her intention to 
alter the advance directive but, at the relevant time, has not yet done so, the health 
professional should not comply with that directive, and is excused for doing so. 
 
4. Uncertainty 
At common law, a health professional is justified in not following an advance directive if it is 
not expressed in clear terms, so its meaning is uncertain or ambiguous.28  For example, a 
directive may refuse the provision of ‘heroic measures’, but not elaborate on what sort of 
medical treatment that might mean.29  The possibility of an advance directive being uncertain 
is considered specifically only in the Queensland legislation.  That Act excuses a health 
professional from complying with a directive if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the direction is uncertain.30  The legislation does not define ‘uncertainty’.  However, 
before a health professional can be regarded as having reasonable grounds for reaching such a 
conclusion, he or she must have consulted any attorneys who have been appointed under the 
advance directive about the direction.31  
 
The authors suggest that the statutory jurisdictions that have not done so should enact an 
excuse that permits a health professional to disregard an uncertain advance directive. The 
nature of these documents is that they are often predicting an uncertain future so there is a real 
danger that a directive given now will end up being ambiguous.32  Having said this, there is 
less scope for uncertainty arising in Victoria where an advance directive can only be given in 
relation to a medical condition from which the adult is currently suffering.33  Given that the 
legislation further requires the adult to be informed about the nature of the condition to an 
extent that is sufficient to make a decision about the treatment that he or she wishes to 
refuse,34 it is less likely that an advance directive made in Victoria would be uncertain.  
Nevertheless that possibility still remains, as it does in the other statutory jurisdictions. 
 
It may be that even without a specific excuse, an uncertain advance directive need not be 
followed in those statutory jurisdictions.  An advance directive can only give directions if 
they are clear and are capable of determining an adult’s medical treatment.  Put simply, it may 
be that an uncertain advance directive is not capable of dictating what medical treatment an 
adult does or does not receive and so will not bind a health professional even where there is 
no specific excuse.  Including such a provision in legislation though, would add greater 
certainty and it would also enable the prescription of certain steps before a directive can be 
found to be uncertain as is the case in Queensland. 
 
The authors suggest that the Queensland approach might provide a useful model for the other 
statutory jurisdictions.  A positive obligation should be imposed on a health professional to 
make enquiries from those close to the adult if the meaning of an advance directive is 
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uncertain or ambiguous. If such consultation is capable of providing certainty, then the 
advance directive should be followed. If certainty is not achieved, the health professionals 
should not comply with the directive.35  Such an approach represents an appropriate balance 
between autonomy in that a directive is followed where possible, but the sanctity of life 
principle is respected by not complying with an uncertain or ambiguous advance refusal of 
life-sustaining medical treatment. 
 
5.  Incorrect information or assumptions 
At common law, an advance directive which is based on incorrect information or an incorrect 
assumption will not operate if the adult would not have intended that the refusal apply in the 
circumstances that have arisen.  Although unnecessary to decide, both Donaldson MR and 
Butler-Sloss LJ endorsed this statement of law in Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment).36  
The example commonly cited is based on that case, and that is where the adult’s advance 
refusal of blood products was based on the erroneous assumption that non-blood products 
would be a satisfactory alternative should treatment be necessary at a later stage.   
 
None of the statutes contain an equivalent provision regarding a directive being based on 
incorrect information or an incorrect assumption.  However, in two of the statutory 
jurisdictions, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, there are requirements to provide 
information that will reduce the chance of an advance directive being based on flawed 
material.37  Although the Queensland legislation does not create such an excuse or impose a 
requirement to specifically inform an adult completing an advance directive, another excuse 
in that legislation may achieve the same effect. A health professional is entitled not to follow 
an advance directive if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that a direction in it is 
inconsistent with good medical practice.38  It would be inconsistent with good medical 
practice to rely on an advance refusal of treatment that would result in the death of an adult 
where that advance refusal was based on incorrect information or an incorrect assumption of 
sufficient importance. 
 
The authors suggest that all statutory jurisdictions should have an excuse that permits non-
compliance with an advance directive that is based on incorrect information or an incorrect 
assumption.  However, such an excuse should require that the incorrect information or 
assumption be so significant that the adult would not have intended the directive to operate in 
the circumstances that in fact existed.  Although the right to self-determination or autonomy 
should generally take priority, in circumstances where that decision is based on flawed 
material, it is appropriate for the principle of sanctity of life to prevail.  If such an excuse is 
not enacted, a minimum requirement should be the imposition of a duty to provide 
information as required in the Australian Capital Territory. 
 
6. No decision made 
This category involves those situations where an advance directive has been made but is not 
intended to apply to a particular set of circumstances because it is found that the directive 
does not make a decision in relation to those circumstances.  This category involves some 
overlap with earlier categories but it is distinguished from the situation where a directive was 
based on incorrect information or an incorrect assumption and where a change of 
circumstances arose.  Those categories deal with where a decision has been made, but that 
decision should not be acted upon.  The uncertainty category is also distinguished because, in 
that case, there is doubt about what decision has been made. 
 
A commonly cited example of where an advance directive had been made but is construed as 
not involving a decision in relation to the circumstances that arose is the American case of 
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Werth v Taylor.39  In that case, a court held that a refusal of blood transfusions was not 
effective to cover the situation where blood became necessary to save a pregnant woman’s 
life.  This is despite the fact that documents refusing blood transfusions were signed two 
months prior to the woman’s admission, and that the woman made verbal statements to the 
same effect at the time of the admission.  The Michigan Court of Appeals found that because 
the directive was given at a time when the woman’s life was not in danger, she was not 
regarded as having made a decision to refuse blood transfusions in the subsequent life-
threatening situation that arose. 
 
The statutory jurisdictions do not have a specific excuse that relates to the scope of a decision 
so the opportunity for a court to engage in an interpretive exercise is probably more limited.  
However, an argument advanced earlier in relation to uncertainty would also apply here.  An 
advance directive is only effective to guide decision making if it actually makes a decision.  A 
statutory directive that does not make the decision that arises in the circumstances will 
therefore not be binding.   
 
The authors do not have reservations about the existence of this excuse, because clearly a 
directive that has not made a decision about treatment should not be followed.  However, 
there are concerns about how advance directives may be interpreted to find that no decision 
has been made and so the directive need not be followed.  These concerns relate to issues of 
proof and are outside the scope of this paper.40   
 
7. Contrary to good medical practice 
At common law, a health professional cannot refuse to follow an advance directive because 
that direction is contrary to conventional notions of what is in the medical best interests of the 
adult.  If a valid advance directive applies to the relevant circumstances that have arisen, then 
it must be followed.  This is also the law in all of the statutory jurisdictions except 
Queensland.  In that jurisdiction, a health professional is excused from following a valid 
advance directive if he or she has ‘reasonable grounds to believe that a direction in an 
[advance directive] is ... inconsistent with good medical practice…’.41 The Queensland 
provision is interesting though because the excuse is one that permits a health professional 
some discretion.  It does not prohibit the following of an advance directive that is inconsistent 
with good medical practice; it simply excuses from liability a health professional who chooses 
to ignore it.42 
 
Individuals have different views about what quality of life is acceptable to them and what 
medical treatment they are prepared to accept or endure.  Advance directives allow an adult to 
give directions about withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment in 
particular circumstances, thus allowing the adult to make a choice about when he or she wants 
to refuse treatment and be permitted to die.  An excuse based on good medical practice 
seriously weakens the essence of advance directives: the ability of an adult to choose the 
treatment that he or she wishes to refuse, even if others may disagree. It also undermines the 
primacy that the common law has given to the right to self-determination or autonomy.  The 
practical effect of the excuse is that an adult cannot be confident that his or her advance 
directive will be followed if it is not considered good medical practice for that treatment to be 
withheld or withdrawn.  The authors are of the view that the excuse should be repealed and 
that, in this context, the common law position reflects a more appropriate balance between the 
right to self-determination or autonomy, and the sanctity of life. 
 
8. Conclusion 
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The presumption when dealing with a valid advance directive refusing life-sustaining medical 
treatment must be that such a directive is binding on health professionals.  The right to self-
determination or autonomy requires that the wishes of a competent adult be respected and that 
treatment not be given contrary to that directive.  However, it is also appropriate that the law 
recognise that there are circumstances in which a health professional not following an 
advance directive should be excused.  The State interest in preservation of life reasonably 
requires that a directive be disregarded, for example, in cases where the directive was based 
on a misunderstanding of the existence of alternative treatments, or where circumstances have 
changed significantly since the directive was completed and the adult now has different 
views.   
 
The common law and the various statutory jurisdictions achieve this balancing exercise 
between the right to self-determination and the sanctity of life in different ways.  The 
common law does not contain a set of specific excuses, relying instead on an enquiry as to 
whether the adult intended the directive to apply to the circumstances that ultimately arose.  
The statutory regimes, on the other hand, tend to require adherence to advance directives 
except where not doing so is specifically excused by the legislation.  Despite the different 
approaches at common law and under statute, generally the law manages the balance between 
respecting autonomy and ensuring life-sustaining medical treatment is not withdrawn 
inappropriately reasonably well.   
 
There is, however, one glaring exception:  the excuse of good medical practice that is 
available under the Queensland legislation.43  It is suggested that this part of the law be 
repealed as it is an inappropriate limit on the right to autonomy.  One of the critical functions 
of advance directives is that they allow adults to make decisions with which treating health 
professionals (and others) may disagree.  An excuse that permits non-compliance with a 
refusal of treatment based on notions of good medical practice defeats that function and 
should not be recognised. 
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